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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ROSENN, Circuit Judge. 
 
The primary issue raised on this appeal is an unusual 
question of statutory interpretation: does a municipality 
violate the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C.S 201 et 
seq. ("the Act" or "FLSA") when it complies with its 
employees' request that their overtime compensation be 
accumulated and payment deferred for as much as six 
weeks after their regular pay. The plaintiff, Albert J. 
Brooks, a K-9 police officer of the Village of Ridgefield Park 
(the Village), filed a complaint in the United States District 
Court for the District of New Jersey on his behalf and 
others similarly situated alleging, inter alia , that the Village 
violated Section 207(a) the Act by failing to pay them 
overtime promptly. The complaint also sought statutory 
liquidated damages in an amount equal to the late overtime 
which Brooks already had received in accordance with the 
collective bargaining agreement between the police officers 
and the Village. 
 
Before trial, seven other police officers employed by the 
Village joined the litigation as plaintiffs. Brooks, the initial 
plaintiff, and LaTour, another K-9 officer, settled all of their 
claims with the Village. As a result, the only claim 
remaining was for liquidated damages by the other officers. 
The parties cross-moved for summary judgment. The 
district court denied the Village motion for summary 
judgment and held that the municipality was in violation of 
the FLSA because its overtime payments violated the FLSA. 
The court awarded liquidated damages to the plaintiffs and 
the parties stipulated to the amount. The Village timely 
appealed.1 We affirm in part and vacate in part, remanding 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 1291. The district court had 
subject matter jurisdiction under 29 U.S.C. S 206. The district court 
entered judgment for the plaintiffs in the aggregate amount of 
$55,403.53 plus reasonable attorney's fees and costs. 
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for further proceedings with respect to the Village's good 
faith defense to the plaintiffs' claims for liquidated 
damages. 
 
I. 
 
On March 8, 1996, Brooks commenced this action 
alleging that the defendant Village violated the FLSA by 
failing to pay him and other Village police officers for the 
time they spent outside regular working hours caring for 
Village-owned police dogs. He later amended the complaint 
to include a second claim, alleging that the Village violated 
the FLSA by failing to pay overtime promptly in violation of 
29 U.S.C. S 207(a). Subsequently, seven other Village police 
officers joined the action as plaintiffs. 
 
The parties agreed to submit the liquidated damages 
issue to the district court to determine whether the Village 
acted reasonably and in good faith based on stipulated 
facts, various documents and legal memoranda. The court 
found that the Village failed to comply with the proof 
requirements imposed by this court upon employers who 
seek to escape the otherwise mandatory award of liquidated 
damages. Reluctantly, the district court awarded liquidated 
damages to the plaintiffs, but invited the Village to seek 
appellate review. 
 
II. 
 
On appeal, the Village raised two issues. First, did the 
district court correctly conclude that the deferred payment 
of overtime as contained in the collective bargaining 
agreement between the Village and its police officers 
violated the FLSA? Second, all overtime wages having been 
paid in full within six weeks or less of the time earned, did 
the district court err in awarding liquidated damages, a 
sum equal to the full overtime already paid? Subsumed in 
this question is whether the district court correctly 
concluded that the Village failed to establish a good faith 
defense. 
 
A. 
 
We turn to the first question and commence with a brief 
background of the FLSA. Congress enacted the Act almost 
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at the very depth of the Great Depression of 1932 that 
drove this nation into economic and social convulsions. 
"Millions of families ... were trying to live on incomes so 
meager that the pall of family disaster hung over them day 
by day." Lipman, Plesur, and Katz, A Call for Bright-Lines to 
Fix the Fair Labor Standards Act, 11 Hofstra Lab. L.J. 357, 
359 (Spring, 1994) 
 
One of the objectives of the Act was to increase the size 
of the work force, thereby spreading the work and reducing 
unemployment. Congress believed that requiring employers 
to pay an overtime premium whenever an employee worked 
over forty hours in a work week would encourage employers 
to hire additional workers rather than pay the overtime 
penalty. Another objective of the FLSA was to ensure a 
fixed, fair minimum wage and a reasonable workweek for 
industries where workers did not have sufficient bargaining 
power to achieve "fair working conditions and collective 
agreements." Id. at 359-60. The Supreme Court of the 
United States observed that the Act recognized the unequal 
bargaining power between employer and employee, and that 
"certain segments of the population required federal 
compulsory legislation to prevent private contracts on their 
part which endangered national health and efficiency and 
as a result the free movement of goods in interstate 
commerce." Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 
706-07 (1945). (Footnote omitted). To accomplish its 
objectives, Congress provided in the FLSA for minimum 
wages and a standard work week of forty hours with 
premium pay for hours in excess thereof. 29 U.S.C. 
S 207(a)(1). When an employer violates the overtime 
provisions of the Act, Section 216(b) of the FLSA provides 
for payment of both unpaid wages and an equivalent 
amount of liquidated damages. 29 U.S.C. S 216(b). 
 
The FLSA originally did not apply to state and local 
government. However, the Court's decision in Garcia v. San 
Antonio Metro. Transit. Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985), extended 
the scope of the Act to state and local governments, 
reversing its prior decision in National League of Cities v. 
Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). In Usery, the Court had held 
that states and municipalities were not subject to this kind 
of federal regulation. Although the Village was aware of 
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Garcia and of its obligation to abide by the FLSA, Village 
officials believed that there was nothing improper about 
their deferred overtime payment schedule, especially 
because Local 36 of the Policemen's Benevolent Association 
("the PBA"), the exclusive bargaining representative for the 
local police officers, solicited and agreed to the payment 
schedule set forth in the collective bargaining agreement. 
Moreover, officials of the Village relied on its labor counsel 
for advice and guidance in drafting a labor contract whose 
contractual provisions complied with federal and state law. 
The agreement ultimately negotiated and drafted also had 
the benefit of PBA's labor counsel. 
 
We turn to the initial question whether the FLSA 
mandates the payment of overtime wages promptly and, if 
so, may the parties be permitted to defer payment by 
consensual agreement. 
 
B. 
 
For many years, a collective bargaining agreement had 
been in effect between the Village and the PBA governing 
the terms and conditions of plaintiffs' employment. The 
Village has always paid the plaintiffs their regular pay on a 
weekly basis pursuant to the terms of the current collective 
bargaining agreement and the Act. 
 
In the negotiations for the 1982-83 collective bargaining 
agreement, the Village representatives understood from the 
PBA that its members wanted overtime to accumulate and 
be paid to them by separate check on a monthly basis 
rather than on a weekly basis because it better served their 
personal conveniences. The payment schedule at issue here 
allowing the accumulation of overtime had remained 
unchanged in successive collective bargaining agreements 
until December 1996. The Village then modified the 
collective bargaining agreement without objection by the 
PBA to provide for payment of overtime on a weekly basis 
in response to the claims raised in this lawsuit. 
 
The Village knew of Garcia and of its obligation to abide 
by the FLSA. Village police chief Walter Grossman attended 
a seminar jointly held by the New Jersey Association of 
Chiefs of Police and the New Jersey Conference of Mayors 
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sometime in the mid-1980's at which Garcia and the FLSA 
were discussed. Elizabeth Hannigan, Village Clerk from 
1984 to 1993, received information concerning Garcia from 
the League of Municipalities sometime in 1985. Fred 
Criscuolo, Village Mayor from 1980 to 1992, was aware that 
the FLSA had become applicable to municipalities, but did 
not know the extent of its application. 
 
All village officials understood that after Garcia the FLSA 
required overtime pay after forty hours of work in a week. 
Even before Garcia, the Village had complied, and even 
went beyond the statutory requirements. In accordance 
with the collective bargaining agreement, it paid premium 
pay after eight hours in a day, and for work on a regularly 
scheduled day off, and premium pay for other time outside 
of the regularly scheduled workday, such as court 
appearances. Thus, Village police officers were paid 
overtime on a daily basis if they worked over eight hours 
and whenever they worked more than forty hours in a 
week. It is undisputed that all Village police officers have 
always received the full amount of overtime compensation 
due in accordance with the payment schedule set forth in 
the collective bargaining agreement. The overtime 
compensation, however, was not paid weekly with the 
regular pay but within six weeks or less after the work 
week as requested by the police officers. 
 
C. 
 
The FLSA does not specifically address when overtime 
compensation must be paid. Many years after its 
enactment, the Department of Labor ("DOL") issued an 
interpretative bulletin in 1972 fixing a time limit for the 
payment of overtime compensation. The Bulletin reads in 
pertinent part: 
 
       There is no requirement in the Act that overtime 
       compensation be paid weekly. ... Payment [however] 
       may not be delayed for a period longer than is 
       reasonably necessary for the employer to compute and 
       arrange for payment of the amount due and in no 
       event may payment be delayed beyond the next pay 
       day after such computation can be made ... ." 29 
       C.F.R. S 778.106. 
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The district court adopted the interpretation contained in 
DOL's bulletin, although it mistakenly characterized it as a 
regulation. See Brook v. Village of Ridgefield Park, New 
Jersey, 978 F.Supp. 613, 617 (D.N.J. 1997). The court 
thoughtfully reasoned that were it to hold that"an 
employer is not obligated to compensate an employee for 
overtime worked during a given week on the regular pay 
day for that week, this would lead to an ambiguous 
standard for determining when wages became `unpaid' 
under the statute. Employers would then be permitted to 
withhold overtime compensation for some undefined period 
of time without incurring any legal liability and employees 
would be left with no recourse during this delay." Id. at 
617-18. The court therefore concluded that the Village 
violated Section 207(a) of the FLSA unless the Village 
satisfied the exception found within the bulletin. The 
exception permits an employer to delay payment for a 
period "reasonably necessary for the employer to compute 
and arrange for payment of the amount due if the correct 
amount of overtime compensation cannot be determined 
until some time after the regular pay period[.]" Id. at 618. 
The court concluded that the Village failed to make any 
evidentiary showing that the exception contained in the 
bulletin applied. Id. It therefore held that the Village was 
required to pay the plaintiffs for overtime on the regular pay 
day for each week.2 
 
The Village, however, contends that there is no FLSA 
violation. It submits that the district court erred in relying 
on the DOL's interpretative bulletin. It further asserts that 
the bulletin provides a guideline, not an inflexible rule, for 
determining whether the payment schedule satisfied the 
FLSA. Admittedly, interpretive bulletins do not rise to the 
level of a regulation and do not have the effect of law. A 
court is not required to give effect to an administrative 
interpretation. See Batterson v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 425 
n.9 (1977)(citing General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 
125, 141-145 (1976); Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231-37 
(1974)). Instead, the level of deference given to an 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The district court's interpretation and application of the FLSA is 
subject to plenary review. See Martin v. Cooper Elec. Supply Co., 940 
F.2d 896, 900 (3d Cir. 1991). 
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interpretative bulletin is governed by the bulletin's 
persuasiveness. See Reich v. Gateway Press, Inc. , 13 F.3d 
685, 699 n.17 (3d Cir. 1994); Goldberg v. Sorvas , 294 F.2d 
841, 847 and 847 n.11 (3d Cir. 1961).We believe the DOL 
bulletin is a reasonable construction of the FLSA. 3 The 
Court's decision in Walling v. Harnischfeger Corp., 325 U.S. 
427, 432-33 (1944) and our decision in Dunlop v. New 
Jersey, 522 F.2d 504, 510 n.10 (3d Cir. 1975) suggest this 
result. The reasons advanced by the district court for 
following the bulletin are pragmatic and persuasive. We 
therefore perceive no error in the district court's ruling that 
the overtime payment schedule of the Village violated the Act.4 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. "While the interpretative bulletins are not issued as regulations under 
statutory authority, they do carry persuasiveness as an expression of the 
view of those experienced in the administration of the Act and acting 
with the advice of a staff specializing in its interpretation and 
application." Overnight Motor Co. v. Missel , 316 U.S. 572, 580-581 
(1941). 
 
4. The dissent is apprehensive that we are "superimposing the terms of 
the interpretive bulletin" on the statute with respect to overtime 
payments which contains no time of payment requirement with respect 
to overtime. However, we plainly have stated in the text of this opinion 
that "the interpretive bulletin does not have the effect of law" (supra at 
9) and that the level of deference given to it depends upon the bulletin's 
persuasiveness. Our opinion holds that the FLSA impliedly requires 
prompt payment, not because the bulletin trumps the statute or imposes 
its terms upon the Act, but to hold otherwise would negate its overtime 
provisions. A rejection of the prompt payment requirement for overtime 
would leave employers and employees without any standard for 
determining when overtime wages become unpaid under the FLSA and 
employers would be permitted to withhold them indefinitely without any 
recourse for the employee. 
 
Caruso v. Blockbuster - Sony Music Entertainment Center, 174 F.2d 
166 (3d Cir. 1999) relied on by the dissent, is inapposite. In Caruso, 
Congress directed the Department of Justice to issue regulations with 
respect to the Americans with Disabilities Act. Accordingly, regulations, 
having the effect of law, require public notice and comment before their 
adoption by an administrative agency or any alteration in the agency's 
new interpretation of its regulations which result in significantly 
different 
rights and duties than previously existed. No regulation is involved in 
this case and, therefore, there is no issue concerning notice-and- 
comment rule making. 
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The Village plausibly argues that the DOL interpretative 
bulletin is not controlling in the circumstances before us 
because the parties negotiated the overtime compensation 
schedule; both possessed equal bargaining power, 
negotiated in good faith, and incorporated the schedule in 
successive collective bargaining agreements over a period of 
years. Furthermore, the Village reminds us that it was at 
the behest of the Union that the agreements provided for 
the officers to accumulate overtime pay; the schedule, it 
urges, served the police officers' personal convenience, did 
not offend the objectives of the FLSA, and was not contrary 
to law. 
 
The nonwaivable nature of the provisions of the FLSA is 
well-settled, even if obtained by negotiations for a collective 
bargaining agreement. See Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best 
Freight System, Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 740-41 (1981). See also 
Bay Ridge Operating Co. v. Aaron, 334 U.S. 446, 463 
(1948)("nothing to our knowledge in any act authorizes us 
to give decisive weight to contract declarations as to the 
regular rate of pay because they are the result of collective 
bargaining."); Jewell Ridge Coal Corp. v. Mine Workers, 325 
U.S. 161, 167 (1945)("employees are not to be deprived of 
the benefits of the Act simply because they are well paid or 
because they are represented by strong bargaining 
agents."). 
 
We understand the Village's agitation, considering that 
the delayed payment of the officers' overtime compensation 
was the brainchild of the police officers themselves. 
Nonetheless, we hold that as a matter of logic and policy, 
the provision of the interpretive bulletin embodies an 
important aspect of the FLSA and must be sustained. We 
therefore perceive no error in the district court's conclusion 
that the Village violated Section 207(a) of the FLSA. We 
believe, however, that the Village's argument is more 
suitable for consideration in our discussion pertaining to 
the plaintiffs' claim for liquidated damages for the Village's 
violation. We therefore turn to that issue. 
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III. 
 
A. 
 
The FLSA provides that "[a]n employer who violates the 
[overtime] provisions of ... section 207 ... shall be liable to 
the employee or employees affected in the amount of ... 
their unpaid overtime compensation, ... and in an 
additional equal amount as liquidated damages ... ." 29 
U.S.C. S216(b). The liquidated damages provision amounts 
to a Congressional recognition that failure to pay the 
statutory minimum and overtime wages may be so 
detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum standard 
of living "necessary for health, efficiency and general well- 
being of workers"5 that double payment must be made to 
compensate employees for losses they might suffer by not 
receiving their lawful pay when it was due. See Brooklyn 
Savings, 324 U.S. at 707; Martin v. Cooper Elec. Supply Co., 
940 F.2d 896, 907 (3d Cir. 1991). 
 
Congress subsequently mitigated the harshness of the 
liquidated damage provision of Section 216(b) with the 
enactment of Section 260 of the Portal-to-Portal Act. This 
section permits the district court in its sound discretion to 
withhold or reduce the amount of liquidated damages"if 
the employer shows ... that the act or omission giving rise 
to such action was in good faith and that he had 
reasonable grounds for believing that his act or omission 
was not a violation of the [FLSA]." 29 U.S.C. S 260. In 
Martin, this court explained: 
 
       The good faith requirement is a subjective one  that 
       "requires that the employer have an honest intention to 
       ascertain and follow the dictates of the Act." ... The 
       reasonableness requirement imposes an objective 
       standard by which to judge the employer's conduct ... 
       Ignorance alone will not exonerate the employer under 
       the objective reasonableness test ... 
 
       If the employer fails to come forward with plain and 
       substantial evidence to satisfy the good faith and 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Section 2(a), 52 Stat. 1060. 
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       reasonableness requirements, the district court is 
       without discretion to deny liquidated damages. 
 713<!>940 F.2d at 907-08 (quoting Williams v. Tri-County 
 
Growers, Inc., 747 F.2d 121, 129 (3d Cir. 1984))(emphasis 
in original). 
 
In determining an employer's subjective good faith, a 
court must find that the employer had an honest intention 
to ascertain and follow the dictates of the FLSA. Marshall v. 
Brunner, 668 F.2d 748, 753 (3d Cir. 1982). Meanwhile, the 
reasonableness of an employer's conduct is determined by 
an objective standard. Id. To satisfy the objective standard, 
"the employer must act `as a reasonably prudent man 
would have acted under the same circumstances.' " Addison 
v. Huron Stevedoring Corp., 204 F.2d 88, 92 (2d Cir. 
1953)(quoting Addison v. Huron Stevedoring Corp. , 96 
F.Supp. 142, 155 (S.D.N.Y. 1950). Hence, an employer's 
ignorance alone is not sufficient in meeting the objective 
test. See Brunner, 668 F.2d at 753. 
 
B. 
 
The Village argues that it made a good faith effort to 
comply with the FLSA by taking affirmative steps to meet 
its obligations under the Act. The Village noted that it, as 
well as the PBA, retained experienced labor counsel and 
relied on counsels' advice during the collective bargaining 
negotiations. It reasonably expected of counsel that the 
terms and conditions negotiated by them in good faith 
complied with the law. In rejecting the Village's defense that 
it acted reasonably and in good faith, the district court 
reluctantly concluded that our decision in Martin precluded 
such a defense. We do not agree. 
 
The focal point of our decision in Martin concerned the 
basic overtime pay and record keeping provisions of the 
FLSA, as well as the "administrative" exemption provided 
under Section 213(a)(1) of the Act. 940 F.2d at 899. The 
decision did not concern delay in overtime payments, 
particularly when the delay is at the employees' Union's 
request. In Martin, it was undisputed that the employer 
failed to pay any overtime compensation to its assistant 
warehouse managers, computer operators, purchasing 
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agents and inside sales persons. Id. Instead, the employer 
argued that its inside salespersons and purchasing agents 
were exempt from the Act's overtime payment requirement 
under Section 213(a)(1), despite stipulating that its 
assistant warehouse managers and computer operators 
were not exempt. Id. As a threshold matter, the employer 
claimed that its inside salespersons and purchasing agents 
occupied bona fide administrative positions that exempted 
them from the forty hour weekly maximum provision under 
the Section 207(a) of the Act. Id.6 
 
Disagreeing with the employer's claimed exemption, the 
district court in Martin determined that the employer's 
"inside sales persons `[we]re not engaged in `servicing' the 
business,' " and thus, the employees failed to qualify for 
exemption under the Act. Id. at 904. We affirmed in part on 
the basis that the district court's determination was not 
clearly erroneous within the meaning of Section 213(a)(1) of 
the FLSA because the employees did not qualify under the 
first prong of the Secretary of Labor's short test regulation 
codified under 29 C.F.R. SS 541.2(e)(2) and 541.214. This 
regulation focuses on whether a particular employee's 
primary duties are related to management policies or 
general business operations. See Id. at 901, 905, 906-07, 
907 n.10.7 
 
The plaintiffs in the instant case, unlike the plaintiff in 
Martin, can only point to an obscure interpretive bulletin, 
which does not carry with it the mandatory weight of the 
Act, nor does it even rise to the level of a regulation. What 
constitutes "prompt" payment for overtime compensation is 
neither a provision of the FLSA itself nor is it defined by the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. In addition to Martin, the district court cited Williams as precedent 
obligating an award for liquidated damages. However, the employer in 
Williams, like the employer in Martin, violated among other things the 
mandatory requirements specifically set forth under the FLSA. In 
particular, in Williams, the employer not only failed to pay its employees 
the minimum wage rate for all hours worked mandated under Sections 
206 (a)(5) & (a)(1), but also failed to maintain accurate records as 
explicitly required under Section 211(c) of the FLSA. 747 F.2d at 127. 
 
7. As we previously noted, unlike interpretive bulletins, regulations are 
given " `considerable and in some cases decisive weight.' " Skidmore v. 
Swift, 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). 
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Act. Moreover, the text of the DOL interpretative bulletin 
notes that "[t]here is no requirement in the Act that 
overtime compensation be paid weekly." See  29 C.F.R. 
S 778.106. 
 
Thus, considering the record before us, and the 
circumstances under which the employer acquiesced to the 
deferral of overtime payment, there was little, if any, reason 
to put the Village on notice that it was potentially violating 
the DOL's bulletin. At oral argument, plaintiffs argued that 
counsel representing the Village should have inquired on 
his own as to whether the parties' delayed payment 
arrangement complied with the FLSA. Nothing occurred, 
and no one suggested that some further inquiry should be 
made, especially since the time scheduled for premium 
payment was consensual. Under such circumstances, 
counsel's failure to make further inquiry does not 
necessarily constitute a lack of good faith and reasonable 
conduct on the part of the Village officials. 
 
The anomaly of this litigation is highlighted by an 
analysis of the Village's good faith argument. The essence of 
this lawsuit arises out of the plaintiffs' persistent request 
over many years that their overtime be paid separately and 
accumulated. The employer now is being sued by the 
plaintiffs for having complied with their request made 
through their exclusive bargaining agent, the PBA, during 
the course of collective bargaining. Under the Labor 
Relations Act, collective bargaining is required to be 
conducted in good faith. Instituting this litigation by the 
plaintiffs suggests, therefore, that the plaintiffs did not 
bargain in good faith. In no time during the negotiation of 
successive collective bargaining contracts did the employees 
or their Union raise any objection to the deferred payment 
of overtime or its legality. Because the deferment of 
overtime originated with the plaintiffs and their Union, it is 
understandable that the Village had no reason to believe 
that the overtime pay could not be legally delayed. 
 
Nonetheless, the plaintiffs argue that the Village took no 
steps to ascertain or follow the FLSA; that the Village was 
on notice that the FLSA barred it from satisfying the 
employees' request for deferment and that it should have 
taken affirmative steps to inquire whether deferment was 
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legally permissible. The defendants stipulated that they 
have no evidence that they ever researched the legality 
under the FLSA of the payment schedule in the collective 
bargaining agreement or that they ever asked counsel to 
review the legality of overtime payment structure before the 
amended complaint was filed. The Village officials and their 
counsel had no recollection of ever researching or seeking 
advice on the legality under the FLSA or any provision of 
the FLSA before the filing of the amended complaint. 
 
Furthermore, the plaintiffs argue that the Village had in 
its possession since 1986 an approximately five hundred 
page tome entitled "Special Report, FLSA: What It Means, 
What To Do," which might have advised it whether 
employees could waive their rights. The book attempts to 
assist readers in familiarizing themselves with the FLSA 
and its impact on states and municipalities after Garcia. 
The stipulation of facts refers to four places in the book 
with respect to general principles of overtime, its 
computation, and questions and answers pertaining to 
"cash overtime." Our perusal of the book does not disclose 
a single page dedicated to the precise issue before us. The 
plaintiffs may be stretching too far when they expect lay 
officials of a municipality to thoroughly review, have the 
ability to know the substance and legal interpretation of the 
contents, and find the answer to this issue, in that huge 
volume. 
 
In response, the Village notes its reliance on the collective 
bargaining negotiations, as well as the retention by the PBA 
of experienced labor counsel and the Village's reliance on 
its own counsel during the collective bargaining 
negotiations. Therefore, it asserts that it was reasonably 
entitled to believe that the provisions of the contract did not 
controvert the law, including the FLSA.8  The district court, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. In support of its position, the Village cites Featsent v. City of 
Youngstown, 70 F.3d 900 (6th Cir. 1995). In that case, as in this, 
municipal counsel represented the City in collective bargaining 
negotiations and there was no evidence that at any time the City's 
attorney advised it that the contractual method of calculating overtime 
violated the FLSA. The court stated that "[f]rom its attorney's silence, 
the 
City was entitled to the reasonable belief that the Agreement did not 
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however, believed that under precedents of this circuit, the 
Village had to present proof "that it took any affirmative 
steps to determine the FLSA's requirements as to the timing 
of overtime payments," and, in the absence of such 
evidence, it was "precluded from finding that the Village 
had a good faith and reasonable belief that its overtime 
payment schedule did not violate the statute." Brooks, et al. 
v. Village of Ridgefield Park, et al., unpublished letter order, 
issued August 27, 1998 (Cir. No. 96-1079) at 5. 
 
We do not believe that the affirmative action required 
under the facts in Martin precludes a determination by the 
court of good faith and reasonableness by the Village in the 
circumstances of this case in complying with its obligations 
under the FLSA. In Martin, the employer was concerned 
with the mandatory core requirements of the Act itself on 
the delicate and highly important question of whether a 
segment of its employees was totally exempt from 
compliance with the minimum wage, hour, and record 
requirements of the Act. Here, the employer is concerned 
with none of the mandatory requirements of the Act, but 
only compliance with an interpretive bulletin relating 
merely to a consensual deferment of overtime pay only. In 
Martin, the employer unilaterally adopted a practice that 
would permit it to escape payment required under the 
minimum wage and hour provisions of the Act. Here, the 
employer fulfilled all of the basic wage and hour 
requirements of the Act; the only issue is the timeliness of 
overtime payment. In Martin, the employer unilaterally 
eliminated a segment of its labor force from the mandatory 
provisions of the Act. In this case, the employer acted 
consensually with its employees pursuant to collective 
bargaining in good faith under the Labor Relations Act. In 
this case, deferring payment of the required overtime served 
the convenience of the workers and in no way constituted 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
violate the law, including the FLSA." Id. at 907. The Featsent court also 
cited with approval similar decisions of the Fourth and Fifth Circuits: 
Foremost Dairies v. Ivey, 204 F.2d 186, 190 (5th Cir. 1953); Hill v. J. C. 
Penney Co., Inc., 668 F.2d 370,375 (5th Cir. 1982); Van Dyke v. Blufield 
Gas Co., 210 F.2d 620, 622 (4th Cir. 1954). 
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an attempt to escape the minimum wage and hours 
provision of the FLSA.9 
 
Because the district court believed it was precluded from 
finding that the Village had acted in good faith and 
reasonably believed that its overtime payments did not 
violate the Act, the court made no findings of fact on the 
issue. We believe that neither Martin nor any of our 
precedents preclude the district court in the circumstances 
of this case from determining whether the Village acted 
reasonably and in good faith in complying with the request 
of their employees. Accordingly, we will remand this case to 
the district court with instructions to make the requisite 
findings of fact on this issue. 
 
IV. 
 
In summary, we hold that the failure of an employer 
subject to the FLSA to pay overtime promptly in accordance 
with the DOL's 1972 bulletin violates the Fair Labor 
Standards Act. However, we believe that Martin  and earlier 
precedents of this court are inapposite to the facts and 
circumstances of this case and do not preclude the trial 
court from determining whether the defendant acted 
reasonably and in good faith in consensually deferring 
payment of the overtime due the plaintiffs. Accordingly, the 
judgment of the district court with respect to liquidated 
damages will be vacated and the case remanded for 
proceedings consistent with this opinion and for the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. We note that in Martin, the employer's failure to comply with the 
minimum wage, hour and record provisions struck at the objectives and 
purpose of the Act - the maintenance of a standard of living "necessary 
for the health, efficiency, and general well being of workers." In this 
case, 
deferring payment of the required overtime served the convenience of the 
workers and in no way constituted a threat to their health and general 
well being or an attempt to escape the minimum wage, hour and 
overtime pay. Granting liquidated damages under such circumstances 
may, in the words of the district court, "result in a windfall to the 
plaintiffs that runs contrary to the compensatory purposes of this 
remedy." 978 F. Supp. at 619. 
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requisite findings of fact. 
 
Each side to bear its own costs. 
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RENDELL, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 
 
My difficulty with my colleagues' ruling stems from their 
initial determination that the interpretive bulletin at issue 
should be engrafted on the statute, so that the Village is 
held to have violated "the Act." The majority then follows a 
tortuous route to essentially strip the bulletin of its force by 
crafting a new element of the "good faith" test whereby if 
the violation was based upon a mere interpretative bulletin 
and was consensual, the good faith exception may apply. 
 
Instead, I urge that we should conclude, as we did in 
Caruso v. Blockbuster-Sony Music Entertainment Centre, 
Nos. 97-5693, 97-5764, 1999 WL 185040 (3d Cir. Apr. 6 
1999), that an agency's interpretive pronouncement that 
effects a substantive change in the law (as opposed to 
merely providing an interpretation of an ambiguous 
statutory provision) does not have the force of law. By 
superimposing the terms of the interpretive bulletin 
regarding the time within which overtime payments must 
be made on a statute which contains absolutely no time of 
payment requirement with respect to overtime, we are not 
deferring to an interpretation, but, rather, we are effecting 
a substantive change, which, as we pointed out in Caruso, 
should occur only after the notice and comment that 
precede the enactment of a regulation.1  Id. at *9 ("[I]f an 
agency's new interpretation will result in significantly 
different rights and duties . . . , notice and comment is 
required."); see also Dia Navigation Co. v. Pomeroy, 34 F.3d 
1255, 1265 (3d Cir. 1994) (rejecting an agency regulation 
imposing new duties and obligations beyond the reach of 
the statute without the benefit of notice and comment). 
Case law has viewed this particular bulletin as a"guide," 
and I suggest that we should not heighten its significance 
by endowing it with the force of law. See Reich v. Interstate 
Brands Corp., 57 F.3d 574, 576 (7th Cir. 1995); Beaston v. 
Scotland School for Veterans' Children, 693 F. Supp. 234 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The concept of "prompt" payment of overtime originated in caselaw. 
See Brooklyn Savings Bank v. O'Neill, 324 U.S. 697 (1945). I do not 
quarrel with that requirement and believe the payment here could be 
said to be "prompt." However, the agency interpretation at issue goes far 
beyond "prompt," mandating, in this case, next paycheck swiftness. 
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(M.D. Pa. 1988). Accordingly, I would reverse because there 
has been no violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act. 
Therefore, I respectfully dissent. 
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